I found this study compelling, but hard going. The authors examine and model lying (or deceitful utterances) by dismantling and reassembling the logic of belief. They start with three St. Augustine statements, that lying is an “utterance believed to be false by the speaker,” that it is “uttered with the intent to deceive,” and that it is “successful if the lie is believed by the addressee.” They go on to examine the logic of “manipulation in public discourse,” and game theory using the game Liar’s Dice. I found it a challenge to work through the doxastic models; however, if you are familiar with logic, this is an interesting study.

The first case examines cynicism, or believing nothing that is announced in public discourse. The modeling leads to nine propositions proving that “deliberate misleading” or obfuscation occurs in the public or political realm, with calculable consequences. In Liar’s Dice, there is some question whether lying in the Augustinian sense actually occurs, because, as the authors explain, the players expect to be tricked and are negotiating the lie rather than being genuinely deceived. Walton and Krabbe [1] developed an analysis and classification of six dialogue types where two parties attempt to persuade, bully, or negotiate, for example, to gain an advantage.

This paper is well worth reading if you are interested in modeling dialectics.