This paper provides an interesting application of the standard “stable marriage algorithm” for the assignment of university places to students in view of entry standards, student preferences, and the number of available places. It assumes that a National Applications Office controls such assignments, as is apparently the case in some European nations. Examination results, along with the student’s weighted preferences for courses, the college requirements, and the number of students to be admitted in each college, are used, with the object of obtaining as high a student satisfaction level as possible while still meeting all college requirements (stable marriage). In essence, the algorithm maximizes student preference (satisfaction- ), while at the same time ensuring that the ranks (examination score plus other considerations of the college) of those admitted will be at least as good as the ranks of those rejected, with the additional constraints imposed by the college’s minimum admission requirements which, of course, must also be met. This problem has also been discussed by Gale and Shapley [1], McVitie and Wilson [2,3], and Proll [4]. It might also be applied in the US for the problem of assigning sorority pledges to rush parties during pledge week, with only minor changes.